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Prompted by concordant upward trends in both the university advancement rate and the 
unmarried rate for Japanese women, this paper investigates whether the Equal 
Employment Opportunity Act (EEOA), which was passed in 1985, affected women’s 
marriage decisions either directly or via their decisions to pursue university education. 
To this end, we estimate a model that treats education and marriage decisions as jointly 
determined using longitudinal data for Japanese women. We find little evidence that the 
passage of EEOA increased the proportion of women who advance to university, but 
strong support for the proposition that it increased the deterrent effect of university 
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The striking decline in Japanese birth rates over past thirty years has prompted national 
concern, with fertility rates well below the population replacement rate (Faruqee and Mühleisen 
2001; Japan Ministry of Health, Labour and Welfare 2015).1  The resulting shrinking population 
means that in the future, the country’s old-age dependency ratio will increase as the large post-
war baby boom and baby boom echo cohorts are supported by subsequent, smaller cohorts.2  
Coincident with this decline in birth rates have been a decline in marriage rates (Sakamoto and 
Kitamura 2008) and a rise in the mean age of first marriage (Japan Ministry of Health, Labour 
and Welfare 2015), both of which are linked directly by fertility researchers to the decline in 
birth rates.3  Over the same period, with the passage of the Equal Employment Opportunity Act 
(EEOA) in 1985 and subsequent supporting legislation, career opportunities available to women 
have expanded, especially for women with a university education.4   
                                                 
1 The total fertility rate reached its lowest point, at 1.26, in 2005 and though it has risen in 2014 to 1.42, it is still 
well below the population replacement rate (Japan Ministry of Health, Labour and Welfare 2015). 
2 The ratio of those aged 65 and above to the working-age population (aged 20-64 years) is estimated to rise from 
27% in 2000 to 47% in 2025, higher than estimated for other low-birth-rate counties like France and Italy (Faruqee 
and Mühleisen 2001, Table 1). 
3 As many researchers have noted (e.g. Hashimoto and Kondo, 2012), because the average number of children borne 
by a married couple has stayed relatively constant since the 1970 and the percent of births that take place outside of 
marriage is very small (less than 2% in 2003), it is the decline in the marriage rate of women that accounts for the 
overall declines in fertility.  See also Narayan and Peng (2007).  For a general review of models of marriage and 
childbirth see Ermisch (2003) and Brien and Sheran (2003). 
4 For a good review (in English) of the 1985 EEOA as well as the 1997 legislation (that went into effect in 1999) 
that substantially strengthened the original law, see Araki (1998). Yamada (2013) also summarizes these two laws 
and also provides a description of the subsequent 2006 law, which further expands on the original EEOA. In earlier 
literature the EEOA was referred to as the Equal Employment Opportunity Law, or EEOL, as opposed to the Equal 
Employment Opportunity Act, but EEOA is a more apt translation of the Japanese title for this law. With regard to 
legislation covering leaves for child and elder care, Japan Ministry of Health, Labour and Welfare (2010) is a good 
reference. 
3 
The goal of this paper is to investigate the possible role the passage of the Equal 
Employment Opportunity Act in explaining the delay and decline in women’s marriage, both 
directly and through the link of higher education.  Existing literature has documented the 
increased proportion of women who get a university education over this period and suggested 
that the EEOA may have played a role in this increase (Edwards and Pasquale 2003, Abe 2011).  
At the same time, the large economic and demographic literature on the determinants of 
women’s marriage propensity and timing underscores the role of educational attainment in 
marriage decisions, with university-educated women more likely than others to delay marriage 
(e.g. Raymo 2003).  To our knowledge, only one paper (Abe 2011) addresses the possibility that 
the passage of the EEOA could be a factor in women’s marriage decisions, but that paper does 
not explicitly test this proposition.  In our paper, we address this void by investigating whether 
the EEOA affected women’s marriage decisions either directly or via their decisions to pursue 
university education.  Our  model treats education and marriage decisions as jointly determined-- 
something that has not been done in previous research on Japanese women—and is estimated 
using data from the Japanese Panel Survey on Consumers (JPSC).  
Focusing on the likelihood that women marry by age 32, our research provides strong 
support for the proposition that the passage of the EEOA played a role in the delay and decline of 
marriage.  Specifically, even when we take explicit account of the effect of unmeasured personal 
attributes on education and marriage decisions, we find that the deterrent effect of university 
education on marriage more than doubles for post-EEOA cohorts of women, as compared to pre-
EEOA cohorts.  University-educated women in post-EEOA cohorts are 16 to 19 percentage 
points less likely than their less educated contemporaries to be married by age 32, whereas for 
pre-EEOA cohorts the corresponding decline is at most 7 to 8 percentage points.   On the other 
4 
hand, we find that the decision to obtain a university education is primarily determined by a 
young woman’s ability and a host of family background characteristic, with the EEOA having an 
ambiguous and at best small impact.  Overall, our findings indicate that for those seeking to 
understand the declines over the past 30 years in marriage and fertility in Japan, it is important to 
take into account the role played by the EEOA. 
In the sections below, we review selected recent research on the relationships among 
education, marriage, and the EEOA; sketch out a model of joint decision making with regard to 
education and marriage; describe the JPSC data; and provide estimates of our model using a 
recursive bivariate probit statistical methodology.  A final section summarizes our conclusions 
and suggests some implications. 
Background and Related Research 
The trends that prompt our research and that of many others are illustrated in Figure 1.  
Shown in this figure are data from 1970 to 2013 for the total fertility rate, the percent of women 
aged 30-34 not married, the percent of female high school graduates who advance to university, 
and, for comparison, the percent of male high school graduates who advance to university. 
Throughout this period there has been a dramatic decline in the total fertility rate which, while 
increasing slightly since its nadir in 2005, still remains well below the replacement rate.  At the 
same time, the percent of women aged 30-34 who remain unmarried has steadily increased, from 
under 10% in 1970 to almost 35% in 2010.5  Roughly parallel with this rise in the proportion 
unmarried is the increase in young women’s advancement rate to university, growing from under 
                                                 
5 Young women’s mean age at first marriage has also been increasing over this period, from 24.2 in 1970,  to 28.8 in 
2010, to 29.3 in 2013  (Japan Ministry of Health, Labour and Welfare 2015). 
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10% in 1970 to over 45% in 2010.  It is noticeable that the slopes of both of the latter two growth 
curves become steeper after 1985, the year in which the EEOA was enacted by the Japanese Diet.  
The advancement rate to university of young men also increased over the entire period, though 
less uniformly than that of women, but the difference between the advancement rates of men and 
women shrinks noticeably after 1985.  
These concordant trends suggest the following set of hypotheses, which we investigate in 
this paper:  (1) The passage of the EEOA, by expanding career opportunities of university-
educated women, increased the proportion of qualified women who follow this educational path;  
(2) The expanded career opportunities associated with university education  influence women’s 
marriage decisions, leading them to delay or decline marriage;  (3) The passage of the EEOA 
(and subsequent supporting legislation), which changed the legal and  cultural landscape to make 
a career path more socially and economically attractive to women,  increased the “deterrent” 
effect of university education on marriage.  
 To explore these hypotheses, we develop and estimate a multivariate model of the 
interrelationship between Japanese women’s education and marriage decisions and the role of the 
EEOA in these decisions.6  No other studies directly address this set of hypotheses, but there are 
a number which examine some of the relevant relationships.  Below we review the studies that 
most directly inform our research.  
 
 
                                                 
6 Models like the one we use in this paper owe a great debt to the seminal work of Gary Becker on human capital, 
marriage, and the economics of the family (see, for example, Becker, 1976 and 1993). 
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The EEOA/Labor Market Link 
The hypotheses we explore are based on the assumption that the EEOA expanded career 
opportunities for university-educated women.  Three recent papers, Abe (2011), (2010), and 
(2013), investigate this assumption by looking at effects of the EEOA on women’s employment 
and earnings.  The findings in these three  studies, described in more detail below, indicate that 
the primary strategies used by post-EEOA cohorts of women  to improve their career and labor 
market outcomes are to become university graduates, to work full-time (as opposed to part-time), 
and  to delay or decline marriage.   
Abe (2011) looks at women’s labor force behavior over the life cycle using data from the 
Japanese Employment Status Survey (ESS, Shugyo Kozo Kihon Chosa) from 1998 to 2007.  She 
explores how the EEOA affected women’s full- and part-time employment patterns both by 
marital status and by level of educational attainment.   Her methodology relies on comparing 
cohorts of women who entered the labor market after the EEOA went into effect with earlier, 
pre-EEOA, cohorts.  Abe reports that the overall employment/population ratio of women has 
increased for more recent cohorts of women, but that when one distinguishes between part-time 
work and full-time “regular” employment, most of this overall increase is accounted for by an 
increase in part-time work.  When the focus is narrowed to women’s employment in full-time, 
regular positions-- the kinds of positions that were expected to be more available to women after 
the passage of the EEOA-- and after roughly taking into account macro-economic conditions, 
Abe finds that only for university graduates did this employment rate increase for post-EEOA 
cohorts.   
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Taking this analysis further, Abe decomposes changes in full-time employment by 
marital status and finds that it was not that the full-time employment rate increased for both 
married and unmarried university-educated women, but rather that the proportion of these highly 
educated women who remained unmarried had increased.   Pulling together these threads, we 
have a story in which in the post-EEOA period, women with a university education were 
delaying marriage (some perhaps choosing not to marry) and, since unmarried women have 
higher full-time employment rates than do married women, this delay translated to a higher full-
time employment rate of university women as a group.  Abe’s findings are based on a model that 
does not allow for the explicit possibility that marriage rates and educational attainment are 
themselves affected by the EEOA, but she recognizes these links in her conclusion:  “Since the 
enactment of the EEOA, more women with university education have married late or stayed 
unmarried” (p. 52).   
Abe (2010) targets the gender wage gap in Japan, rather than employment, and seeks to 
determine the impact of the EEOA using cohort data from the Basic Survey of Wage Structure at 
five-year intervals beginning with 1975 and ending with 2005.  Focusing on full-time workers 
only, she shows that while the overall female/male full-time wage ratio increases over this period, 
this shift is mainly attributable to an increase in the educational attainment of the full-time 
female labor force.  For university-educated women, the female-to-male wage gap narrowed very 
little for post-EEOA cohorts.  
Abe (2013) is a survey paper which summarizes the result above, but also reports on 
research that explores the possibility that the EEOA may have had different impacts across the 
various Japanese regions.  With regard to the latter topic, she concludes that such differences do 
exist: the post-EEOA increase in employment rates of university-educated women that she had 
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documented in earlier research was most evident in the Tokyo area, most likely because that is 
where there is the greatest availability of managerial positions. 
Taken together, these studies suggest that the benefits to Japanese women of the career 
opportunities enabled by the EEOA were to be obtained mainly by investing in university 
education and working (especially in Tokyo) a full-time schedule, the latter of which is 
facilitated by delaying or declining marriage.  Abe (2013) comments that “…the EEOA did not 
increase the number of women who achieve both family and career…” (p. 32), positing that the 
scarcity of childcare and the costliness of commuting were likely obstacles. 
Higher Education and the EEOA 
The role of the EEOA law in young women’s decisions with regard to post-high-school 
education is addressed in Edwards and Pasquale (2003).  Using micro-data from the first wave of 
the Japanese Panel Survey on Consumers (JPSC), Edwards and Pasquale’s analysis holds 
constant family background, demographic factors, and economic conditions in estimating the 
effect of the passage of the EEOA on the higher education decisions of young Japanese women.  
Their model does a good job of explaining higher education decisions, but the results with regard 
to the effect of the EEOA are not robust, in part because only two cohorts in the survey had made 
educational decisions after the passage of the law.  Nonetheless, their research provides 
suggestive evidence that the passage of the law was associated with an increased propensity of 
young women to choose university education over junior college.  
Marriage 
There is an extensive economic and demographic literature on women’s marriage rates in 
Japan, much of it focusing on explaining the secular declines illustrated in Figure 1.  To our 
9 
knowledge, none of this literature explicitly addresses the possible role of the EEOA in 
contributing to this decline, but a variety of other explanations have been explored.  Some 
studies focus on the role of labor market conditions, including unemployment rates of men, 
women, or both (e.g. Higuchi 2001, Miyoshi 2014, and Hashimoto and Kondo 2012).  Other 
studies focus on the role of the women’s own earnings and income (e.g. Higuchi 2001, and Sakai 
2009).  Still others focus on the increasing levels of women’s educational attainment and the 
resulting reduced relative availability of potential spouses with the requisite level of education—
dubbed the “marriage mismatch” hypothesis (e.g. Raymo 2003 and Raymo and Iwasawa 2005).  
Other studies target increased income or other transfers (housing, for example) from parents to 
daughters as a potential explanation-- dubbed the “parasite single” hypothesis (Sakamoto and 
Kitamura 2008).    
  These studies examine different hypotheses and use different data sets, but they have 
one common feature: all find that a woman’s educational attainment is an important correlate of 
when she marries.  Specifically, all of these studies report that women with a university 
education are more likely to delay marriage.7  With regard to the question of whether this delay 
translates into a lower overall likelihood that university-educated women marry, the studies are 
not definitive.  Results differ depending on the set of explanatory variables held constant in the 
analyses: for example, Raymo (2003) estimates a set of alternative models which yield 
contrasting results on this point.   
                                                 
7 Even though university-educated women delay marriage while in school, they catch up to some extent later—the 
difference in mean age at marriage between university graduates and high school graduates is substantially less than 
four years (see Shirahase 2000, especially Table 1). 
10 
Other factors that have been found to be statistically significant in one or more of these 
various studies are: the woman’s age; measures that represent various aspects of the labor market 
for both men and women, including the woman’s own income; measures that represent 
socioeconomic characteristics of her parents, including their income, health, and work status; 
measures that reflect income or other transfers from her parents, including housing; 
characteristics of the woman’s natal family; demographic measures that reflect the availability of 
potential spouses; and the region in which she lives and its rural/urban characteristics. 
A Model of Joint Education and Marriage Decisions  
Pulling together the findings cited above, we see that the EEOA is likely to have 
positively affected the probability that women attend university; that university-educated women 
are more likely than other women to be employed in full-time positions and to delay marriage; 
and that a woman’s decision to marry is empirically related to her level of education, her family 
background, labor market conditions at the time of her graduation and thereafter, and her 
earnings and income.  The papers on marriage referenced above do not incorporate in their 
models the possibility that marriage and education are jointly determined; nor do they consider 
the possibility that the EEOA might be related to marriage decisions.  The model described 
below incorporates these innovations.   
The Japanese Context 
Japanese women typically choose between two types of post-high school education—
university and junior college— but it is university education that provides the background for a 
11 
career. 8  Junior college curricula are typically limited and three-quarters of them “offer a single 
curriculum in non-vocational subjects, such as music, home economics, and English literature” 
(Ishida 1998).  Junior college education is likely to be better preparation for marriage than for 
career employment, and the financial returns from a junior college education may run 
predominantly through the marriage market as compared to the labor market.  University 
education, in contrast, offers a curriculum that provides superior preparation for career 
employment, though it too may improve a young woman’s marriage prospects.9  The education 
decision we focus on, therefore, is the decision to attend or not attend university.   
A distinguishing feature of Japanese higher education is that, unlike the United States 
where people leave and re-enter post-high school educational institutions at various points in life, 
education in Japan is more structured; few women are in any type of formal schooling after 
marriage.  In addition, the path to university education is well defined, so that without proper 
preparation in the high school years (or even before, in some cases), a Japanese student cannot 
expect to enter university.10  These features provide the setting within which education decisions 
are made in Japan. 
                                                 
8 Other post-high school options are colleges of technology and specialized training colleges, which provide a wide 
variety of vocational and practical skills but are not typically considered to be comparable to university, though in 
some cases they may be comparable to junior colleges.  
9 In the context of the United States, Goldin (1992), Lengren and McIntyre (2006), Ge (2011) and others have 
shown that a large part of the returns to university education is via the marriage market:  by attending university, 
young women come in contact with highly educated young men who will have greater future earning power. For 
example, doing a “back-of-the-envelope” computation, Lengren and McIntyre estimate that about half of the 
increase in a woman’s “available income” (including income that she receives through her marriage) associated with 
her own higher education comes through the marriage market. 
10 This characterization of access to university education is appropriate at the time the women in this sample were 
attending university, but more recently there have been changes. For example, in 1997 only 5% of private 
universities fell below their enrollment limits, but by 2008 the situation had changed dramatically, with 47% of 
12 
The Model 
The model we sketch out below captures in stylized form this context and is similar in 
spirit to the model outlined by Lefgren and McIntyre (2006) (hereafter referred to as L&M).  
L&M posit a two-period model in which a woman’s education decision is made in the first 
period and her marriage decision is made in the second period.11  They also postulate that a 
woman’s education does not directly affect her “draw” in the marriage market, but because 
higher education is associated with higher earnings, her education does affect whether or not a 
particular draw from the distribution of potential husbands will be acceptable to her.  The higher 
her own level of education, the fewer the number of men acceptable to her as a potential spouse.   
In this model, the resulting relationship between educational attainment and marriage can be 
positive or negative, depending on whether a woman’s higher level of education has a stronger 
effect on her own earnings or on her share of her husband’s earnings.12  L&M also show, as we 
will below, that a woman’s educational choice is related to her future marriage expectations and 
                                                                                                                                                             
private universities falling below their enrollment limits. As a result, more universities are now enrolling students 
with lower test scores than would have been acceptable in the past; such universities have been dubbed “free-pass” 
universities by the Japanese media.  For a detailed discussion of recent changes in Japanese higher education see 
Igami (2014). 
11  L&M apply this two-period model to data for the United States, but the model is more appropriate in the context 
of Japan than it is for the United States, where it is not at all uncommon for people to enter and/or reenter university 
after marriage or after having had children. 
12 L&M use an instrumental variable strategy to estimate their model using data from the 2000 U.S. Census of 
Population.  They find that women’s education “appears to have a substantial causal effect on husband’s earnings” 
(p. 788) but has a relatively small impact on a woman’s probability of marriage.  Another paper that looks at the 
interrelationship between education and marriage decisions in the U. S., Ge (2011), focuses on the increased 
financial gains from marriage obtainable by attending college (because of the better set of potential spouses from 
which to choose).   Ge reports that the expected financial gains from marriage are a significant determinant of a 
woman’s decision to attend college, but has a much less impact on her college completion. 
13 
that not taking into account this potential endogeneity can lead to biased coefficients of the 
education variable in a marriage equation.  
 While our model is inspired by L&M, it differs because we focus on tracing the effects of 
the EEOA on the interrelated decisions regarding education and marriage rather than on 
measuring the economic status of women before and after marriage.  We assume that a young 
woman’s (and her family’s) decision with regard to whether or not she will get a university 
education is well defined by the time she is near the end of high school-- at  age 17 (this age 
corresponds to period one in L&M’s model).  Variables that affect this decision would include 
family demographic and socioeconomic characteristic, the expected costs and returns to a 
university education, and unmeasured ability and taste factors that reflect a young woman’s 
desire for career employment and marriage. The marriage decision is assume to take place after 
her education is completed (this corresponds to period 2 in the L&M model), and is determined 
by the young woman’s educational attainment (which, in line with L&M, will affect her financial 
returns to marriage), her family background, various indicators of the states of the marriage and 
labor markets, and unmeasured taste and culture factors that influence both her career aspirations 
and her judgment about the desirability of marriage.    
The features described above are best captured by a recursive bivariate probit statistical 
model, represented mathematically below (see Greene 2008, pp. 823-826 for a discussion of this 
model).   
∗ , 1 if ∗ 0, 0 otherwise, 





In this system of equations, the dichotomous variable  represents whether or not a young  
woman completed university,13  represents whether or not she has been married by the age of 
3214, and  y* and z* denote latent variables of y and z, respectively.  The factors which affect the 
education decision, denoted by , are similar to those in Edwards and Pasquale (2003), while 
the error term  picks up unmeasured ability, tastes for education, taste for marriage, and taste 
for career employment, all as of the time the young woman is making her higher education 
decision.  The factors that affect the marriage decision, denoted by mx ,  follow closely  the 
marriage literature cited earlier, while the random error term, , picks up various luck factors 
that determine a marriage match and also the young woman’s unobservable taste for career 
employment and marriage at the time of completing her education. The variables in   and  , 
which have some common elements, are described in detail in the next section.  The 
dichotomous variable EEOA, appearing in both equations, indicates whether or not a young 
woman’s education decision was made before or after the passage of the EEO Act. 
 There are two other things to note about the econometric model.  First, the error terms in 
the education and marriage equations may be correlated because they both include components 
that represent unmeasured tastes for marriage and career employment. Such a correlation implies 
that educational attainment is an endogenous variable in the marriage equation (Cov[y,	 ] z 0).  
                                                 
13 Like L&M, we posit these relations in the form of regression equations.  In an appendix, L&M sketch out how 
regression equations such as these could be derived, with a set of appropriate simplifying assumptions, from a utility 
maximization framework. Note also that the first equation in the system is similar to the estimating equation in 
Edwards and Pasquale (2003), which is derived from a random utility model. 
14 In this paper, since we are focusing on the marriage decision, we define our marriage variable to include anyone 
who at the point when we observe her had decided to become married, whether or not that marriage ended in divorce. 
Note that divorce is relatively rare in Japan, at about 2 per 1000 population in 2010 (Japan Ministry of Health, 
Labour and Welfare 2015).  In the JPSC data, approximately 1.0% of the previously married women get divorced 
every year.  
15 
Indeed, including the education variable, which is the dependent variable in the first equation, in 
the marriage equation as an explanatory variable is what distinguishes this statistical model from 
a non-recursive model.15 Second, we include an interaction term between the education variable 
and the EEOA variable, as explained below, in order to see if the effect of education on marriage 
changes after the passage of the EEO Act. 
Data and Variables 
 The data used to estimate our model come from a unique micro-level panel survey 
entitled the Japanese Panel Survey of Consumers (JPSC), a nationwide longitudinal survey of 
young Japanese women and their husbands sponsored by the Institute for Research on Household 
Economics (Kakei Keizai Kenkyujo) in Japan. These data are especially suitable for our study 
because they provide a rich set of information about women’s family background, education, and 
marriage. The first wave (Wave A) of this survey was conducted in 1993 and included 1500 
randomly selected women aged 24-34 in that year.16 Subsequent waves (B and C) were added to 
the sample in 1997 and 2003:  Wave B included 500 women aged between 24 and 27 years in 
1997; and Wave C included 836 women aged between 24 and 29 years in 2003. As of 2008, 
there remained approximately 1,650 respondents aged between 29 and 49 in the JPSC. 
 The structure of the data set is illustrated in Figure 2.  Each row in the figure corresponds 
to a year and shows the number of women of each age for whom data are reported for that year.  
                                                 
15 Green (2008) notes, however, that in models such as this one, the endogenous nature of education variable in 
marriage equation “can be ignored in formulating the log-likelihood” (page 823). Hence, in the estimation we are 
able treat the education variable in marriage equation as if it were exogenous. 
16 The survey originally contacted 3,623 randomly selected women in this age group, of whom 1500 were ultimately 
selected to be in the first wave of the panel.  Demographic characteristics of these participants were comparable to 
those of the same age group in the Population Census (Higuchi 2001). 
16 
For example, in 1993, the first survey year of Wave A, there were 151 women aged 24, 161 aged 
25, and so on, for a total of 1500 women aged 24 to 34 in that year.  In the following year, 1994, 
the women have aged one year and there is some attrition, so that there are no women aged 24, 
145 aged 25 (6 women from that age-cohort had dropped out of the survey over the year), 146 
aged 26, and so on, for a total of 1415 women aged 25 to 35 in that year (total attrition was 85).  
Things continue in a similar fashion in 1995 and 1996.  Wave B begins in 1997, with a new 
group of 24 to 27 year-old women added to the survey, and Wave C begins in 2003, with an 
additional group of women aged 24 to 29 added in that year.  From this diagram we can compute 
that the potential number of women for whom we would have family background and education 
information-- both of which come from the questionnaire administered in the initial survey year 
for each wave-- is 2836.  Because of missing observations for some of these variables, our actual 
sample consists of 2598 women.       
Looking at Figure 2 in a slightly different way, one can see that each column shows the 
number of observations available for women of a specified age but at different points in calendar 
time.  For example, if one wanted to study women at age 32, there would be 122 of them 
observed in 1993, 124 observed in 1994, and so on, for a total of 1641 women in the sample who 
responded to the survey at age 32.  Also indicated in this figure is whether women of a particular 
age in a particular year are members of the pre-EEOA cohort or the post-EEOA cohort.  The pre-
EEOA cohort is defined to be women aged 18 or older in 1985, the year that the EEO Act was 
passed; women in this cohort appear in the figure above the dotted diagonal. The post-EEOA 
cohort of women is defined to be those who were aged 17 or younger in 1985; women in this 
cohort appear below the dotted diagonal.   
17 
Our choice of marriage variable—whether a woman is or has been married by age 32—
requires some explanation.  Ideally, we would observe marital status at an older age because not 
all women who plan to marry will in fact be married by age 32. 17    However, given the 
construction of the sample and sample attrition, the later the age at which we observe marital 
status, the fewer observations will be available.  Further, if we choose to observe marital status at 
a later age, the balance between the pre-EEOA and post-EEOA samples is reduced.  Thus, our 
choice is a pragmatic one:  by observing women at age 32, we will capture a large proportion of 
marriages while still having a large enough sample size to address our main hypotheses.18   
      Among our working sample of 2598, there are 2157 women for whom marital status at 
age 32 can be determined.  The difference between these two numbers is attributable primarily 
to: (1) women who remained in the survey through 2008 but had not yet reached age 32 and had 
not yet married; and (2) women who had dropped out of the sample before age 32 and had not 
married prior to dropping out.   
 The variables used in our estimation are defined in Table 1, along with the data sources 
for variables that are not taken from the JPSC. The variables that do not come from the JPSC are 
measured at the level of the prefecture in which the young woman resided as of age 17. The final 
two columns of the table indicate whether the variable appears in the education equation, the 
marriage equation, or both.   
                                                 
17 Because of the lock-step nature of higher education in Japan, we can be confident that women who had chosen 
university education will have completed it by age 32.  Indeed, only 28 people in the entire JPSC sample are 
enrolled in any kind of schooling after the age of 32.   
18 The mean age at first marriage for women in Japan over the time period covered in our data ranged from 25.9 (in 
1990) to 28.8 (in 2010) (Japan Ministry of Health, Labour and Welfare 2015).  
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 The variables in ݔ௘ are similar to  those in Edwards and Pasquale (2003) and include: 
characteristics of the woman’s family background  (parents’ educational attainment, family 
income,  whether the young woman attended private high school, her number of siblings, 
whether she has any brothers, and whether her mother was primarily a homemaker); proxy 
measures of her academic ability (attendance at juku (“cram school”) in elementary (Juku 2), 
junior high (Juku 3), and high school (Juku 4)); proxy measures for the availability and 
opportunity costs of university education in her area as measured at her age 17 (the ratio of 
professors to high school graduates and the vacancy/application ratio); a proxy for the expected 
returns to university education (the ratio for males of the starting wage for university graduates 
relative to that of high school graduates)19; and a dummy variable indicating whether the EEOA 
was in effect when she was 17 years old, which is the age at which we assume her final decision 
with regard to university education is made.  As discussed earlier, the latter variable is included 
because the EEOA aimed to increase women’s access to career employment (and the resulting 
higher lifetime earnings), and university education is the traditional route to this type of 
employment.  
In the case of the marriage equation, the explanatory variables mx represent factors 
suggested by the economic and demographic literature surveyed in the previous section.  
Educational attainment has been found to be an important variable in marriage decisions in 
almost all of the literature that we surveyed and falls directly out of the L&M utility 
maximization model described above; our education dummy variable indicates whether or not 
the young woman completed university. Family background variables like parents’ income, 
                                                 
19 This variable is not specific to the prefecture, but is rather a national average. 
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family structure (number of siblings and whether there is a male sibling), and whether the 
woman’s mother was a full-time homemaker are also commonly used.  To represent the state of 
the labor market around the time that the young woman completes her education a variety of 
proxies have been used (see Higuchi (2001), Hashimoto and Kondo (2010), and Sakamoto and 
Kitamura (2008)).  We use the prefecture vacancy/application ratio at the age she completes her 
schooling to proxy the strength of the labor market she faces post-schooling. 20  A higher 
vacancy/application ratio indicates a stronger job market, which may be positively or negatively 
related to the probability of marriage.21  In addition, following Abe (2013), we include two city 
size variables to proxy the state of the labor market for university-educated women.   
To capture the state of the marriage market we use several variables.  The availability of 
potential spouses with a level of education  equal to that of the woman’s (found to be an 
important factor by Raymo and Iwasawa 2005) is  computed for each birth cohort for each 
prefecture as follows: for women who did not have a university degree, we use the ratio of the 
number of (two years older) male high school graduates (with or without a university education) 
to female high school graduates (without a university education);  for women who had a  
university degree, we use the ratio of the number of (two years older) male university graduates 
to female university graduates.22  We expect this variable to be positively related to the woman’s 
probability of marriage.  The cost of setting up a household is proxied by rent per tatami mat (in 
                                                 
20 The age at which a woman’s education is completed is assumed to be 18 for a high school graduate, 21 for a 
junior college or vocational school graduate, and 23 for a university graduate. 
21 Miyoshi (2014) and others, noting that a strong labor market affects both a woman’s expected earning power and 
the earning power of a potential spouse, refers to the positive relationship the “self-reliance effect” and the negative 
relationship the “good catch effect”.   
22 It is difficult to find data that would have allowed us to compute a more refined measure of spouse availability at 
the prefecture level within Japan. 
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constant yen) in the woman’s prefecture as of the year she completes her education. The search 
costs associated with finding a mate and also varying cultural norms regarding marriage are 
proxied by the two city size variables mentioned above (Sakai 2009).   
To explore the potential impact of the EEOA, we include in the marriage equation the 
EEOA dummy variable as defined above as well as an EEOA/education interaction term.  This 
interaction term, which enables us to estimate separate education coefficients for pre- and post-
EEOA cohorts, permits us to test the hypothesis that the passage of the EEOA increased the 
“deterrent” effect of university education on marriage.    
In addition to these variables we include in both the education and marriage equations a 
set of dummy variables that indicate the geographic district in which the woman lived when she 
was aged 17 (Japan is divided into ten such districts).23  These are included to hold constant any 
district-specific unmeasured taste, economic, or cultural factors that may affect education or 
marriage decisions.  Finally, in some specifications, we include a linear time trend variable. 
Descriptive statistics for all variables are shown in Table 2.   
Results 
 Table 3 presents maximum likelihood estimates of our model.   In discussing these 
estimates, we concentrate on the sign and significance of the coefficients and on comparing the 
two specifications.  We do not discuss the magnitude of the probit coefficients because they are 
                                                 
23 It is possible that women will not be living in the same district at the time they make their marriage decision as 
when they were age 17, but the JPSC data do not permit us to identify the district in which each woman lives 
subsequent to age 17.  The ten districts (called Chiho in Japanese) are Hokkaido, Tohoku, Minami-Kanto, Kita-
Kanto&Koshin, Hokuriku, Tokai, Kinki, Chugoku, Shikoku and Kyushu. 
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not readily interpretable.  To evaluate magnitudes requires the estimation of partial effects, 
which appear in Table 4. 
 We begin with the estimates in column 1. 24  Looking first at the education equation, we 
see that, overall, the variables do a good job of explaining young women’s decisions with regard 
to university education: most of the coefficients are statistically significant and have signs 
consistent with our expectations and with the findings of Edwards and Pasquale (2003). 25  
Family background variables such as family income, parents’ education, and number of siblings 
are significant predictors of the probability that a young woman will attend university, with a 
positive association between parents’ income and education and a negative association between 
family size and education.  Having a brother has a negative sign, but is not statistically 
significant. However, having a mother who was a full time homemaker is positively and 
significantly related to a young woman’s likelihood of attending university; perhaps having one’s 
mother available full time facilitates the young woman’s study.  Surprisingly, attending a private 
high school, which is included as a supplementary wealth measure and also may represent the 
parents’ taste for education, has a negative and significant relationship with the young woman’s 
probability of attending university. With regard to academic ability, attending juku in elementary 
and/or junior high school are indicators of a lower than average level of ability, and attending 
juku in high school is an indicator that the young woman has a high enough level of ability to 
                                                 
24 The education equation is estimated using our entire sample of 2598 observations, while the marriage equation 
uses the 2157 observations for which marriage data are reported. That is, the observations without marriage 
information contribute to the likelihood function of education only.  The main difference between these two samples 
is that the smaller sample is slightly older and (consequently) has a slightly lower proportion of university graduates.  
Put differently, those who do not report marital status are more likely to be from recent cohorts and more likely to be 
university graduates.    
25 Note that Edwards and Pasquale (2003) is not perfectly comparable with this paper because it employs three 
education categories (university, junior college, and all other education) and a logit econometric model. 
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contemplate university. 26    The coefficients of all three juku variables have signs in the expected 
direction--negative in the case of Juku 2 and Juku 3 and positive in the case of Juku 4, --and the 
latter two are statistically significant.  
The variables included to capture the returns to and costs and availability of university 
education do not have statistically significant coefficients.   The vacancy/application ratio 
observed when the woman is aged 17, used to proxy the opportunity cost of attending university, 
has a negative sign  as expected but not statistically significant; the negative sign means that the 
higher this ratio-- corresponding to a more favorable labor market-- the less likely is a young 
woman to attend university.  The variable included to proxy the “supply” of university places in 
the young woman’s prefecture, the professor/high school graduate ratio, which we expected to 
have a positive sign, has a negative sign but it is not statistically significant.   The variable 
included to proxy the expected returns to a university education-- the ratio of the starting wage 
for male university graduates to the starting wage for male high school graduates-- has a positive 
coefficient, as expected, but is not statistically significant.   It may be that these variables do not 
well represent the underlying costs and returns factors we are trying to measure.  
 Finally, the EEOA variable has a positive and statistically significant coefficient, 
implying that young women who were making their higher education decisions after the EEOA 
had been passed were more likely than comparable women from earlier cohorts to attend 
university.   
 Estimates of the marriage equation appear below those of the education equation. 
Consider first the role of having a university education.    Consistent with the studies of marriage 
                                                 
26 See Edwards and Pasquale (2003) for a more detailed discussion of using attendance at juku as a proxy for ability. 
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cited earlier, we find that women’s university education has a negative association with marital 
status by age 32.  However for pre-EEOA cohorts this relationship is not statistically significant.  
Conversely, the coefficient of the Education/EEOA interaction term is negative and significant, 
yielding the result that for post-EEOA cohorts there is a statistically significant negative effect of 
university education on marriage.  To be more specific, the probit coefficient for pre-EEOA 
cohorts is -.324 and not statistically significant, while for post-EEOA cohorts  it is more than 
twice as large, at -.680 (-.324 + (-.356 )), and statistically significant. This result is consistent 
with the hypothesis that the “deterrent effect” of university education on marriage increases 
significantly after the passage of the EEOA.  Interestingly, the EEOA dummy variable itself is 
not statistically significant, indicating that the EEO Act had no added effect on marriage beyond 
that which operates through university education. 
The role of the family background variables is mixed.  Higher family income is 
associated with a lower probability of marriage, as is having a mother who is a full-time 
homemaker, but these are not statistically significant relationships.  In contrast, having more 
siblings has a significant positive relationship to the probability of marriage, while having at 
least one brother has a significant negative relationship with the probability of marriage. Having 
more siblings may reduce a young woman’s responsibilities with regard to caring for aged 
parents, thereby making it more feasible for her to marry.  It is unclear why having a brother 
would be negatively associated with the likelihood of marriage. 
Other variables in the marriage equation are proxies for aspects of the marriage market 
and/or the labor market.  The two city size variables—large city and medium city-- reflect 
unmeasured aspects of both the labor market and the marriage market. The signs of both 
variables are negative and significant, with the coefficient of large city greater in absolute value 
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than the coefficient of medium city.  This result implies that the larger the city in which a woman 
lives the less likely she is to have married by age 32, a result consistent with the findings in Sakai 
(2009).  Rental costs are also significantly related to the likelihood of marriage and in the 
expected direction, with higher rental costs associated with a lower probability of marriage. The 
other measure that proxies the state of the marriage market, spouse availability, is not statistically 
significant and its sign is the opposite what we expected:  the greater the availability of potential 
spouses, the lower the probability of women’s marriage.  The vacancy/application ratio, included 
to capture the state of the labor market, has a negative, statistically significant sign, consistent 
with the findings of Higuchi (2001) that women are less likely to marry when the job market is 
strong.  
Two other findings in Table 3 should be pointed out.  First, the estimated value for the 
coefficient of correlation between the error terms in the education and marriage equations is 
positive but small (.033) and not statistically significant.  This means that the potential 
correlation between unmeasured characteristics of the young woman that affect both education 
and marriage is not large enough to affect our estimates.  Second,  more than half of the district 
dummy variables are statistically significant, indicating that it is important to include these 
variables to hold constant cross-sectional social and economic differences that are not fully 
captured by the socioeconomic variables included in the analysis.  
We next explore a variation in our model. One could argue that the results in column 1 
with regard to the relationships among the marriage, education, and EEOA variables are simply 
reflecting secular trends in cultural attitudes towards the role of women in society rather than any 
“cause and effect” relationship among these three variables.  Put differently, it could be argued 
that the EEOA variable in both equations and the education and education/EEOA variables in the 
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marriage equations are simply proxies for this secular change in attitudes rather being in of 
themselves factors in women’s decision making.  If this argument were true, a trend variable 
added to our estimating equations would be statistically significant and knock out some or all of 
the other variables that have monotonic trends.    
We carry out this robustness test by adding a trend variable to the specifications in 
column 1 of Table 3.  This variable (“Trend”) is coded at one for the oldest cohort in our data 
(those born in 1959) up to 21 for the youngest cohort (born in 1979).  The resulting estimates 
appear in column 2.  As might be expected, the coefficient of Trend has a positive sign in the 
education equation and a negative sign in the marriage equation.  However, in both cases the 
coefficients are not statistically significantly different from zero.  Thus, adding this variable does 
not contribute significant explanatory power to our economic model.  What including this 
variable does do, however, is to sap some strength from the EEOA variable.    Specifically, the 
coefficient of the EEOA variable in the education equation drops to virtually zero and loses 
statistical significance.  Notably, what is not affected by the addition of Trend is the coefficient 
of the education/EEOA interaction in the marriage equation; this interaction maintains its 
statistically significant negative sign (though its coefficient shrinks slightly in absolute value). 
Further Results: Partial Effects 
We have now identified the statistically significant variables that influence the university 
education and marriage decisions of young women, but it is well known that statistical 
significance does not necessarily translate into practical economic or social impact.  To see 
which variables are of consequence to decision making, we compute partial effects.  These 
partial effects are shown in Table 4 and are computed as follows.  In the case of binary 
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explanatory variables, the partial effect is the change in the value of the dependent variable 
associated with shifting the value of the binary variable from zero to one while holding constant 
all other explanatory variables.  In the case of non-binary discrete variables, the partial effect is 
the change in the value of the dependent variable associated with a one unit increase in the 
explanatory variable, again holding constant all other explanatory variables.  For both types of 
discrete explanatory variables, we compute the partial effects using the finite-difference method.   
For continuous explanatory variables, we compute the partial effects using calculus method.  In 
all cases, we compute the partial effects for each observation and then compute of the averages 
of these effects to yield average partial effects (see Greene (2008) or Hasebe (2013) for details of 
partial effects in the recursive bivariate probit model).   Standard errors are computed using the 
bootstrap method with 100 replicates. 
There is an added wrinkle to computing partial effects in a recursive model: variables that 
affect the education decision also affect the marriage decision, but indirectly, via education’s 
impact on marriage.   Therefore, for the marriage equation three types of partial effects are 
shown:  direct partial effects (col. 1)—those that pertain to the explanatory variables (ݔ௠) that 
appear in the marriage equation--; indirect partial effects (col. 2)—those that pertain to 
explanatory variables (ݔ௘) in the education equation--; and total partial effects (col. 3)—the sum 
of direct and indirect partial effects.  In the case of the education equation, there are no indirect 
partial effects, so the direct and total partial effects are the same.   
The partial effects reported in Table 4 correspond to the two specifications in Table 3: 
Panel A contains partial effects computed from the coefficient estimates in column 1 (trend 
variable excluded), while Panel B contains those computed from those in column 2 (trend 
variable included).   In our discussion of this table we focus on the partial effects that are 
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statistically significant, but for the interest of the reader, we have included partial effects for all 
variables.  Recall that partial effects are computed for each variable holding constant all other 
variables and are therefore not additive. 
 To get a sense of the scale of these partial effects, it is useful to keep in mind the level 
and changes in the prevalence of university education and marriage across the cohorts in our 
sample.  The percent of women in our sample with a university education ranged from 11% in 
the earliest cohort to 25% in the final cohort, an increase of 14 percentage points.  Over the same 
period, the percent of 32 year-olds ever married ranged from 100% in our earliest cohort to 73 % 
in the final cohort, a decline of 27 percentage points. 
 The first thing to point out about Table 4 is that for many of the variables, the partial 
effects are virtually the same in both Panels A and B.  Much of our discussion, therefore, does 
not distinguish between the results in the two panels.  Only when there are differences do we 
discuss the results in Panels A and B separately.  
Consider first the education equation.  It is evident in Table 4 (both panels) that family 
background variables play the strongest role in decisions regarding university education.  The 
partial effect of mother’s education is by far the largest:  having a mother with a university 
education is associated with an increased probability that a young woman herself completes 
university by 24 percentage points.  Having a father with a university education is almost as 
powerful, associated with a 18 percentage point increased likelihood of completing university, as 
is attending juku in high school, which is  associated with a 19 percentage point increase in the 
likelihood of completing university.  Being in a high income category is also associated with a 
large partial effect, as compared to being in the lowest income category, at 10 percentage points.  
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Other family background variables that are statistically significant have lesser partial effects, 
ranging from 2 to 4 percentage points.   
There are two variables in the education equation for which the results in Panels A and B 
differ. The first is the vacancy/application rate, which has a statistically significant partial effect 
of -.031 in Panel A and a non-significant partial effect of -.028 in Panel B.  This difference, 
however, if of little practical import: a one-standard-deviation increase in the 
vacancy/application rate is associated with a decline of 1.4 percentage points in the first case and 
1.2 percentage points in the second case. 
The other significant variable for which there is a difference between the two panels is 
EEOA.  In Panel A, being a member of the post-EEOA cohort is associated with a 3 percentage 
point higher likelihood that a young woman will complete university, as compared to members 
of the pre-EEOA cohort, whereas in Panel B this partial effect loses significance and is reduced 
to virtually zero.  Thus, with this range of partial effect estimates for the EEOA variable—0 to 3 
percentage points—we cannot draw an unambiguous conclusion about the importance of the 
EEO Act on young women’s decisions regarding university education. 
Moving to the marriage equation, consider first the direct partial effects.  The single most 
important variable, in terms of the magnitude of the partial effect, is education.  For pre-EEOA 
cohorts a university education is associated with a 7 to 8 percentage point reduction in the 
likelihood that a young woman has married by age 32, though this partial effect is not 
statistically different from zero.  For post-EEOA cohorts, however, the partial effect is much 
larger and statistically significant—ranging from -16 to -19 percentage points.  Given the fact 
that in our sample the proportion of 32-year-olds who have married falls by 27 percentage points 
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over the period in our study, the magnitude of this latter partial effect is remarkable.  This result 
clearly supports the proposition that university-educated women believe that they can best take 
advantage of the enhanced career options associated with the passage of the EEO Act by 
delaying or declining marriage.  
Among the other statistically significant direct partial effects, city size is important: 
women from large cities are 5 percentage points less likely to be married as compared to small 
cities, and the corresponding difference is 4 percentage points for middle-sized cities versus 
small cities.  The number and gender of siblings also has a similar impact:  having an additional 
sibling is associated with about a 4 percentage point increase in the probability of marriage, 
while having at least one brother is associated with a 3 percentage point decline.  The partial 
effects of the rent and labor market variables are comparable in magnitude to those of these two 
family structure variables: a one standard deviation increase in monthly rent (which corresponds 
approximately to a one thousand yen increase) is associated with about a 4 percentage point 
decline in the likelihood of marriage, and a one standard deviation increase in the 
vacancy/application ratio is associated with a decline of 3 percentage points.  In contrast to the 
case of the education decision, for the marriage decision the partial effect of the EEOA dummy 
in both Panels A and B is never significantly different from zero. 
Beyond these direct effects, a number of variables have significant indirect effects on 
marriage through their effects on education, with their sign in marriage equation opposite to their 
sign in the education equation.  These tend to be of a smaller magnitude than the direct partial 
effects and with one exception, are statistically significant only in Panel A,    The exception is 
the  mother’s education variable:  women whose mothers were themselves university graduates 
have a 3.2 to 3.7 percentage point lower probability of marriage by 32, as compared to other 
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women.   In the case of the six variables where both direct and indirect partial effects on 
marriage are pertinent—middle income, high income, homemaker, sibling, brother, and EEOA--, 
the contribution of the direct partial effect dominates the contribution of the indirect partial effect 
so that the  conclusions we drew  when we discussed the  direct effects remains unchanged.   
What conclusions can we draw from these results?  First, young women’s decisions with 
regard to university education are determined primarily by her parents’ education and income, by 
the young woman’s ability, and by her family’s structure.  Economic factors that reflect the costs 
and returns to education do not play a significant role in this analysis.  The role of the EEOA is 
unclear:  with a range of estimates of partial effects of 0 to -3 percentage points, our results are 
suggestive but inconclusive.    
Second, it is clear that young women’s decisions with regard to university education and 
marriage are closely interlinked.  The single most important variable from among those we study 
in determining whether a woman is married by age 32 is whether or not she has a university 
education, but notably, this strong linkage is found only for post-EEOA cohorts.  For pre-EEOA 
cohorts, university-educated women are estimated to be 7 to 8 percentage points less likely to 
married by age 32, compared to their less-educated contemporaries, but this estimate has such a 
large variance that it is not statistically significant.  In contrast, for post-EEOA cohorts, we see a 
strikingly large, statistically significant partial effect of university education on marriage by age 
32, in the range of 16 to 19 percentage points. There is also an intergenerational aspect to the role 
of education in marriage which operates indirectly, with women whose mothers or fathers had a 
university education approximately 3 percentage points less likely to be married by age 32.   
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Third, other factors affect marriage decisions by age 32, but to a lesser extent. Marriage is 
less likely for women who live in large or middle-sized cities or who have a male sibling. In 
contrast, having additional siblings (holding their sex constant) is associated with a higher 
likelihood of marriage.  The role of the labor market is similar to that reported by other 
researchers: when the vacancy/application rate is higher, and jobs more plentiful, women are less 
likely to be married by age 32.  Also, when the cost of setting up a marital home, as reflected by 
average rental costs, is higher, women are less likely to be married by that age.  The passage of 
the EEOA does not appear to have had an important impact in of itself, but rather operates by 
increasing the responsiveness of the marriage decision to university education, as described 
above. 
Conclusions  
 Prompted by declines in Japanese birth rates and marriage rates over the past thirty years, 
this paper seeks to understand how women’s declining propensity to marry interacts with the 
growth over the same period in women’s propensity to attend university, and how both of these 
latter two trends may have been impacted by the passage in 1985 of the Japanese Equal 
Employment Opportunity Act (EEOA).  Using data from a unique Japanese panel survey, the 
Japanese Panel Survey on Consumers (JPSC), we estimate a model that treats education and 
marriage decisions as jointly, though not simultaneously, determined.  Specifically, we use a 
recursive bivariate probit econometric model to capture the particular context within which 
education and marriage decisions are made in Japan.   
Our empirical results provide support for the second and third hypotheses we set out 
earlier, but not for the first.   In the case of our first hypothesis, our evidence about the role of the 
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EEOA in university-education decisions does not provide unambiguous support.   In the case of 
the second and third hypotheses, we find that women who were university educated had a lower 
probability of being married by the age of thirty-two, as compared to other similar women, and 
that the deterrent effect of university education is significantly greater for post-EEOA cohorts 
than for their predecessors.  Overall, our research strongly suggests that the Japanese Equal 
Employment Opportunity Act and the expansion in career opportunities it made available to 
university-educated women was a contributory factor in the decline over the past 30 years of 
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Figure 1. Four-year University Advancement Rate, Unmarried Rate and Fertility Rate
Percentage of male students advancing to four-year universities Percentage of female students advancing to four-year universities
Female unmarried rate (age 30-34) Total fertility rate (right axis)
Source:  Basic School Survey (Ministry of  Education, Culture, Sports, Science and Technology),
Vital Statistics (Ministry of Health, Labour and Welfare),











Year 24 25 26 27 28 29 30 31 32 33 34 35 36 37 38 39 40 41 42 43 44 45 46 47 48 49
1993 151 161 145 115 144 125 143 132 122 106 156 1,500
1994 145 146 136 108 136 115 138 124 117 101 149 1,415
1995 134 139 127 100 133 109 130 119 109 96 145 1,341
1996 132 128 122 98 126 107 128 107 105 93 143 1,289
1997 125 131 127 117 126 121 121 96 121 103 128 103 103 92 135 1,749
1998 110 121 107 97 118 121 114 91 112 95 122 98 97 91 134 1,628
1999 104 110 104 88 107 114 107 88 109 88 117 95 93 88 125 1,537
2000 99 103 99 82 108 109 105 85 106 88 112 91 91 84 119 1,481
2001 94 97 93 80 105 106 102 82 97 84 108 89 86 83 115 1,421
2002 88 88 91 76 100 102 101 82 92 83 105 87 84 82 112 1,373
2003 127 135 152 140 139 143 81 82 88 72 94 97 97 81 87 77 99 85 81 76 106 2,139
2004 106 113 134 119 124 128 77 79 85 71 90 94 95 76 85 70 95 82 79 76 102 1,980
2005 94 107 126 111 119 117 75 72 78 67 84 90 93 71 84 68 92 78 75 70 99 1,870
2006 87 99 116 98 113 108 73 65 75 65 82 85 88 69 82 68 91 75 72 69 94 1,774
2007 82 94 107 94 109 102 70 63 73 65 82 85 87 70 80 64 84 72 67 66 90 1,706




Post-EEOL cohorts are in dotted box.












Completed education JPSC The initial survey year*
University and above, 1; junior college and
below, 0.
Yes Yes
Marital status JPSC At the age of thirty-two Ever married, 1; never married, 0. No Yes
Parents' income JPSC The initial survey year*
Parents' income in the previous year--3 dummy
variables with "low income" as the reference
category.
High income: above 10 million yen per year, 1;
otherwise, 0.
Middle income:  between 2.5 million and 10
million yen  per year, 1; otherwise, 0.
Low income:  below 2.5 million yen, 1;
otherwise 0
Yes Yes
Mother's education JPSC The initial survey year* University, 1;  otherwise, 0. Yes No
Father's education JPSC The initial survey year* University, 1;  otherwise, 0. Yes No
Private high school JPSC The initial survey year* Attended private high school, 1;  otherwise, 0. Yes No
Homemaker JPSC The initial survey year*
During daughter's childhood (birth to age 20),
mother was never employed for pay, 1;  during
daughter's childhood, mother was at some point
employed for pay, 0.
Yes Yes
Number of siblings JPSC The initial survey year* Number of siblings Yes Yes
Having brother(s) JPSC The initial survey year* Has one or more brothers, 1; otherwise, 0. Yes Yes
Juku 2, Juku 3, Juku 4 JPSC The initial survey year*
Juku 2: attended juku in the late years of
elementary school, 1;  otherwise, 0.
Juku 3: attended juku when in junior high school,
1;  otherwise, 0.
Juku 4: attended juku when in high school, 1;
otherwise, 0.
Yes No
Districts 1-10 JPSC The initial survey year*
District the respondent was living in when a
child--9 dummy variables with District 1 as the
reference district:
1) Hokkaido, 2) Tohoku, 3) Southern-Kanto, 4)
Northern-Kanto & Koshin, 5)  Hokuriku, 6)
Tokai, 7) Kinki, 8) Chugoku, 9) Shikoku, 10)
Kyushu
Yes Yes






The initial survey 
year*
Living in Tokyo's 23 wards or in one of the 
other 13 major Japanese cities, 1; otherwise, 
0. (Te reference category for the two city-
size variables  is "towns, villages or overseas".)
No Yes
Medium city JPSC
The initial survey 
year*




Those who were 17 or younger in 1985 (the 
year the EEO Law was passed), 1;  otherwise; 
0
Yes Yes
Trend (Cohort trend) JPSC -
Those who were born in 1959 (the oldest 
respondents) were coded at 1, and so on up to 
those who were born in 1979 (the youngest 
respondents), who were coded at 21.
Yes Yes
Number of professors**
Basic School Survey 
(Ministry of  Education, 
Culture, Sports, Science and
Technology)
At the age of 
seventeen
Number of professors per high school graduate Yes No
Spouse availability**
Basic School Survey 
(Ministry of  Education, 
Culture, Sports, Science and
Technology)
At the age of 
seventeen
For respondents who did not have a university 
degree: the ratio of (two-years senior) male 
high school graduates to female high school
graduates who did not go to university.  For the 
respondents who have a university degree: the 
ratio of (two-years senior) male high school 
graduates who went to university to female 




services statistics (Ministry 
of Health, Labour and 
Welfare)
At the age of 
seventeen
Ratio of job offers to job seekers Yes No
Vacancy/application MA**
Job/employment placement 
services statistics (Ministry 
of Health, Labour and 
Welfare)
At the age of 
completing education#
Ratio of job offers to job seekers No Yes
University/high-school first wage ratio 
Basic Survey on Wage 
Structure (Ministry of 
Health, Labour and Welfare)
At the age of 
seventeen
Ratio of university graduate's first wage to high 




Housing and Land Survey of 
Japan (Statistics Bureau, 
Ministry of Internal Affairs 
and Communications)
At the age of 
completing education#
Real rent per tatami mat, in thousands of yen (a 
tatami mat is approximately 1.7 square meters). 
No Yes
* The JPSC has four different survey waves.  The initial survey year is 1993 for Wave A, 1997 for Wave B, 2003 for Wave C, and 2008 for Wave D.
** indicates that a not-JPSC variable is aggregated at prefecture level.
#  The age at which education is completed is assumed to be 18 for high school graduates, 21 for junior college or vocational school graduates, and 23 for university 
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Table 2: Summary Statistics 
Mean Std. Dev. Min Max
Marital Status 0.8401 0.3666 0 1
Completed Education 0.1690 0.3748 0 1
Large City 0.2587 0.4380 0 1
Middle City 0.5712 0.4950 0 1
Rent 2.2323 0.9384 0.97 4.78
Spouse availability 1.4686 0.4620 0.44 2.78
Vacancy/Applicants 0.8464 0.4338 0.12 2.68
Middle Income Class 0.5350 0.4989 0 1
High Income Class 0.1613 0.3679 0 1
Mother’s Education 0.0400 0.1961 0 1
Father’s Education 0.1790 0.3834 0 1
Private High 0.3045 0.4603 0 1
Homemaker 0.3299 0.4703 0 1
Number of Siblings 2.4707 0.9144 1 12
Having Brother(s) 0.5804 0.4936 0 1
Juku 2 0.3714 0.4833 0 1
Juku 3 0.5889 0.4921 0 1
Juku 4 0.1821 0.3860 0 1
Number of Professors 224.7074 93.9015 12 767
Vacancy/Application 0.8751 0.4390 0.09 2.68
University/High-School First Wage Ratio 1.2361 0.0365 1.15 1.42
EEOA 0.5789 0.4938 0 1






Table 3: Estimation Results: Bivariate Probit Model of Completed Education and Marital Status 
(1) (2) 
Coef. S.E. Coef. S.E.
Education Equation 
     EEOA 0.1561 0.0792 ** -0.0012 0.1301
     Trend 0.0154 0.0104
     Middle Income  0.2157 0.0791 *** 0.2171 0.0791 ***
     High Income 0.4885 0.0985 *** 0.4874 0.0984 ***
     Mother Education 0.8781 0.1472 *** 0.8710 0.1475 ***
     Father Education 0.7274 0.0800 *** 0.7225 0.0802 ***
     Private High -0.1451 0.0721 ** -0.1459 0.0721 ** 
     Homemaker 0.1493 0.0697 ** 0.1571 0.0700 ** 
     Sibling -0.1254 0.0453 *** -0.1257 0.0453 ***
     Brother -0.0973 0.0722 -0.0961 0.0722
     Juku 2 -0.0627 0.0702 -0.0636 0.0702
     Juku 3 -0.1992 0.0728 *** -0.2109 0.0728 ***
     Juku 4 0.7476 0.0787 *** 0.7510 0.0786 ***
     Professor Ratio -0.0003 0.0004 -0.0002 0.0004
     Vacancy/Applicant -0.1596 0.0998 -0.1433 0.0999
     University/High-School First Wage Ratio 0.3796 1.2423 0.1828 1.2485
     constant -1.8857 1.5602 -1.7440 1.5649
 
Marriage Equation 
     Education -0.3238 0.2808 -0.2760 0.2860
     EEOA 0.0802 0.1004 0.1678 0.1456
     Education × EEOA -0.3556 0.1898 *** -0.3376 0.1917 * 
     Trend -0.0117 0.0129
     Middle Income Class -0.0130 0.0773 -0.0111 0.0773
     High Income Class -0.0495 0.1163 -0.0507 0.1159
     Homemaker -0.0806 0.0728 -0.0846 0.0729
     Siblings 0.1662 0.0470 *** 0.1668 0.0471 ***
     Brothers -0.1430 0.0727 ** -0.1443 0.0728 ** 
     Large City -0.2177 0.1148 * -0.2206 0.1146 * 
     Middle City -0.1770 0.1005 * -0.1769 0.1004 * 
     Rent -0.1782 0.0803 ** -0.1662 0.0816 ** 
     Spouse availability -0.1354 0.1462 -0.0728 0.1674
     Vacancy/Applicants -0.3272 0.1005 *** -0.3348 0.1011 ***
     constant 1.4021 0.2849 *** 1.3793 0.2891 ***
ρ 0.0078 0.1318 0.0074 0.1306
N of obs. 2598 2598 
Log Likelihood -1840.5758 -1839.1309 





Table 4: Partial Effects on Education and Marriage Decisions 
Panel A 
Direct Effect Indirect Effect Total Effect 
Estimate Std. Err. Estimate Std. Err. Estimate Std. Err.
Education Decision 
     EEOA 0.0309 0.0141 ** 
     Middle Income  0.0403 0.0116 ***
     High Income 0.1029 0.0222 ***
     Mother’s Education 0.2387 0.0488 ***
     Father’s Education 0.1831 0.0228 ***
     Private High -0.0282 0.0154 ** 
     Homemaker 0.0305 0.0143 ** 
     Number of Siblings -0.0250 0.0097 ***
     Having Brother(s) -0.0195 0.0160
     Juku 2 -0.0124 0.0157
     Juku 3 -0.0402 0.0170 ** 
     Juku 4 0.1864 0.0230 ***
     Number of Professors -0.0001 0.0001
     Vacancy/Application -0.0318 0.0191 * 
     University/High-school First Wage Ratio 0.0757 0.2626
Marriage Decision 
     Completed Education -0.1496 0.0844 ** 
     EEOA 0.0058 0.0240 -0.0048 0.0029 * 0.0010 0.0236
     Middle Income Class -0.0030 0.0168 -0.0063 0.0037 * -0.0094 0.0171
     High Income Class -0.0117 0.0291 -0.0161 0.0088 * -0.0278 0.0274
     Homemaker -0.0191 0.0179 -0.0048 0.0029 * -0.0240 0.0175
     Number of Siblings 0.0389 0.0102 *** 0.0040 0.0025 0.0429 0.0101 ***
     Having Brother(s) -0.0331 0.0164 ** 0.0031 0.0030 -0.0300 0.0164 * 
     Large City -0.0487 0.0289 * 
     Middle City -0.0389 0.0230 * 
     Rent -0.0418 0.0188 ** 
     Spouse availability -0.0317 0.0360
     Vacancy/Applicants -0.0766 0.0250 ***
     Mother’s Education -0.0368 0.0193 *
     Father’s Education -0.0284 0.0153 *
     Private High School 0.0045 0.0035
     Juku 2 0.0020 0.0026
     Juku 3 0.0064 0.0049
     Juku 4 -0.0288 0.0156 *
     Number of Professors 0.0000 0.0000
     Vacancy/Application 0.0050 0.0037
     University/High-school First Wage Ratio -0.0120 0.0428
Note: *** < 1%, ** < 5%, * < 10%.  
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Table 4: Continued 
Panel B 
Direct Effect Indirect Effect Total Effect 
Estimate Std. Err. Estimate Std. Err. Estimate Std. Err.
Education Decision 
     EEOA -0.0002 0.0251
     Trend 0.0031 0.0023
     Middle Income  0.0405 0.0116 *** 
     High Income 0.1024 0.0221 *** 
     Mother’s Education 0.2360 0.0484 *** 
     Father’s Education 0.1814 0.0225 *** 
     Private High -0.0283 0.0155 * 
     Homemaker 0.0321 0.0142 ** 
     Number of Sibling(s) -0.0250 0.0097 ** 
     Having Brother(s) -0.0192 0.0161
     Juku 2 -0.0126 0.0156
     Juku 3 -0.0425 0.0174 ** 
     Juku 4 0.1871 0.0230 *** 
     Number of Professors 0.0000 0.0001
     Vacancy/Application -0.0285 0.0195
     University/High-school First Wage Ratio 0.0364 0.2678
Marriage Decision 
     Education -0.1321 0.0841
     EEOA 0.0277 0.0374 0.0000 0.0038 0.0277 0.0375
     TREND -0.0028 0.0031 -0.0004 0.0004 -0.0032 0.0031
     Middle Income Class -0.0026 0.0168 -0.0057 0.0037 -0.0083 0.0171
     High Income Class -0.0120 0.0290 -0.0142 0.0091 -0.0263 0.0274
     Homemaker -0.0202 0.0403 -0.0045 0.0029 -0.0247 0.0174
     Number of Siblings 0.0392 0.0103 *** 0.0035 0.0025 0.0428 0.0101 ***
     Having Brother(s) -0.0336 0.0164 ** 0.0027 0.0028 -0.0309 0.0164 ** 
     Large City -0.0496 0.0290 * 
     Middle City -0.0389 0.0230 * 
     Rent -0.0391 0.0195 ** 
     Spouse availability -0.0171 0.0403
     Vacancy/Application -0.0787 0.0253 *** 
     Mother’s Education -0.0322 0.0191 * 
     Father’s Education -0.0249 0.0154
     Private High 0.0040 0.0034
     Juku 2 0.0018 0.0024
     Juku 3 0.0060 0.0050
     Juku 4 -0.0257 0.0157
     Number of Professors 0.0000 0.0000
     Vacancy/Application 0.0040 0.0036
     University/High-school First Wage Ratio -0.0051 0.0399
Note: *** < 1%, ** < 5%, * < 10%.  
